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Inhibited Institutionalisms  1
Introduction 
Institutional theory stands on a precipice.  It has reached terrific heights: hundreds of 
papers published in top journals representing multiple areas of research, scholarly monographs 
with leading university presses, special issues of prestigious academic journals, regular 
workshops and conferences, tenured faculty members at top universities, swathes of doctoral 
students and multiple handbooks.  However, these heights are potentially dangerous, and there 
are wisps of criticism that threaten to gust.  Some claim, “that the development of institutional 
theory has shifted from ‘enlightening the masses’ to ‘preaching to the choir’” (van der Voet, 
2014: 129).  Others have complained that ‘institution’ has become a ‘vapid umbrella term’, 
which means everything and nothing (Haveman and David, 2008: 588; David and Bitekine, 
2009).  Alvesson and Spicer (2018) argue that institutional theory has passed its “best before” 
date, partly because of all-embracing definitions and efforts to account for too much, which 
makes it difficult to identify what is distinct about the assembly of research.  Such criticisms are 
not restricted to scholars who work outside of the tradition.  Self-described institutionalists have 
commented that the approach “is creaking under the weight of its own theoretical 
apparatus” (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca, 2011: 52); while others suggest that “we need to ask 
whether its power to explain organizational phenomena is withering in the light of its rather 
splintered proliferation” (Greenwood et al, 2008: 31). 
 We thank Amelia Hawbaker for her comments on this essay.1
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We share these concerns, and our purpose in this essay is to pose a number of provocative 
questions about institutional theory and the practice of institutional research.  We do so as 
scholars who come to institutional theory from different perspectives.  The first two authors are 
sympathetic critics, who recognize the merits of old institutionalism and classic new 
institutionalism, but have become concerned with the expansive scope and potential dominance 
of contemporary institutional research.  The third author identifies as an institutional theorist and 
is likewise concerned that the approach is trying to become all things to all people, a strategy that 
more often ends up angering nearly everyone.  We share the belief that some basic 
problematization and rethinking can be useful for institutionalists and non-institutionalists alike.   
We pose our provocations as questions because we recognize that there are multiple 
answers and arguments to be made.  In doing so our goal is to stimulate the kind of dialogue, 
debate, and reflexivity that Journal of Management Inquiry is so successful in promoting.  We 
explore the implications of the more critical responses to the questions as a means to 
productively problematize aspects of institutional theory and research practice.  It may be useful 
for institutional research to take a step back before venturing further forward.  With this we hope 
to encourage more focused, interesting, and empirically sensitive work, and to promote the 
search for novel and alternative frameworks.  
Institutional theory: theory or brand? 
Q: Do the significant differences in the various definitions of “institution” indicate some 
problem with the notion of IT as a “theory?”  Is IT a coherent “theory,” or is it more of a set of 
varied approaches using the same intellectual brand?   
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There are multiple plausible answers to these questions, and it could be that the 
proliferation of multiple definitions allows for vibrant creativity. Pluralism is often good. For the 
sake of argument, however, let us suggest that the answer to the first of these questions is “yes.”  
It is no secret that, throughout the literature, there are multiple, vague, inconsistent, and 
contradictory definitions of “institutions”–if scholars even bother to define the term at all (R.E. 
Meyer and Hollerer 2014, Purdy et al. 2017).  Going back to “old,” and “new” institutionalism, 
Phillip Selznick and his colleagues meant something rather different than do John Meyer and his 
colleagues.  Selznick’s cadre spoke not so much of “institutions” but rather “institutionalization,” 
whereby organizations underwent a process of value-infusion, often becoming “institutionalized” 
in a manner quite different from the original organizational purpose (Selznick 1943, 1948, 1957, 
Clark 1956, 1970, Messinger 1955, Zald and Denton 1963).  Selznick’s distinctively 
organizational, historical approach is a contrast to Meyer’s field perspective, where macro 
“institutional myths” are idealized cultural accounts that provide a “rational theory of how” 
organizations ought to operate, supplying legitimacy when organizations conform (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977: 342). 
In one sense, these different definitions are not really problematic because “old” and 
“new” institutionalism are theories of different things, but in another sense the shared 
terminology of “institution” masks these differences and creates confusion.  “Institution” as an 
organization that is infused with value and “institution” as responses to expectations to conform 
are different phenomena and involve different conceptualizations that beget different theories.  
Selznick’s is a theory of how organizations come to acquire a distinctive character (1949, 1957), 
whereas Meyer’s is a theory of isomorphism.   
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Things become more complicated and potentially problematic when we consider the 
range of definitions that exist under the now very broad heading of “new” or “neo” 
institutionalism.  In their seminal volume that gave “new institutionalism” its name, DiMaggio 
and Powell (1991) spoke not of “institutional myths,” but rather institutional scripts and 
schemata.  Although the “mythic” approach of Meyer and his colleagues and the “schemata” 
approach of DiMaggio and Powell are both deeply cultural, they gloss an important implication: 
loose coupling is explicit in Meyer and Rowan’s focus on institutional myths and ceremonial 
compliance (1977, 1978), but the concept of institutional schemata, where organizational actors 
are unable to think otherwise, actually implies a much tighter coupling to substantive practices.  
This kind of cognitively driven isomorphism should follow templates quite far into substantive 
activity, and not stop with surface structures.  A well-known criticism of the DiMaggio and 
Powell view (circa 1991) is that it promotes an image of cultural “dopes” (Colomy 1998), but 
dopes that enact institutional scripts unreflectively are not very savvy or good at creating 
ceremonial facades around loose coupling.   
Despite the shared heading of “new institutionalism,” these different definitions may 
imply different theories of organizational conformity—a loosely coupled one and a tightly 
coupled one, with different implications for how organizations operate.  Organizational 
ceremonies and organizational core structures with substantive effects are not the same things.  
Regardless, the many quantitative studies of organizational conformity that followed the seminal 
“new” institutional works relied on measures surface conformity, leaving the question of the 
actual coupling to substantive activity unexamined (Tolbert and Zucker 1983, Baron, Dobbin, 
and Jennings 1986, Baron, Jennings, and Dobbin 1988, Sutton et al. 1994, Chaves 1996).  The 
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dependence on large-N quantitative studies featuring surface measures of conformity created a 
robust set of empirical findings, but they also blurred our understanding of the internal operation 
of organizations (or what Stinchcombe 1997 called the “guts” of institutions), and glossed the 
implicit differences between institutions as cultural “myths” versus cultural “schemata.”   
As new institutionalism has continued to proliferate, so have the definitions of 
“institution.”  Quite often these definitions are only vaguely specified.  This makes it difficult to 
identify the similarities and differences across the definitions, but again, with careful 
consideration they seem to imply different things.  For example, in 1987 Meyer et al. began to 
gravitate away from “institutional myths” and towards “cultural rules,” but “rules” imply less 
space and a tighter coupling between institutions and organizations than does the loosely coupled 
imagery of “myth and ceremony.”  In 1991 Friedland and Alford introduced the alternative 
terminology of “institutional logics” which has recently taken a very expansive turn under 
Thornton et al. (2012), which we discuss later.  In 1995 Scott expanded the definition of 
institutions to include “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide 
stability and meaning to social behavior” (p. 33).  With this expansion “institutions” were still 
cultural phenomena, but not just cultural.  2
Moving into the new millennium, Fligstein (2001, cited by Lawrence and Suddaby 2006: 
216) refers to institutions as  “rules and shared meanings… that define social relationships, help 
define who occupies what position in those relationships and guide interaction by giving actors 
cognitive frames.”  This definition is more narrowly cultural than Scott’s, but it has more 
 “Culture” is likewise a term that is seldom clarified by institutionalists and cultural sociologists 2
alike.  
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expansive implications—institutions are no longer just about organizational conformity but also 
social relationships, social position, and interaction.  Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) expand in a 
materialist direction, defining institutions as “sets of material activities that are fundamentally 
interpreted and shaped by broader cultural frameworks such as categories, classifications, 
frames, and other kinds of ordered belief systems” (p. 996).  Here institutions are both, at once, 
material and cultural, but this is quite different from Meyer and Rowan’s and DiMaggio and 
Powell’s vision where institutions (whether “myths” or “schemata”) were the independent 
variables that explain conformity in organizational forms.   These definitions exhibit quite a bit 
of diversity, suggesting that the meaning of “institution” is not intuitive. And yet, at times, other 
scholars write as if the meaning of “institution” is obvious.  For example, Green and Li (2011: 
1663) discuss “how actors are both constrained and enabled by institutions.”  So institutions 
constrain and enable, but so do many other things, and as a result it is no longer obvious as to 
what “institutions” refers to, or how they are distinct from anything that is more broadly “social.”  
These expansive and often vague definitions vary, and they have varying implications as 
to what is to be explained, and how.  And yet, despite these differences, they are all described as 
or incorporated under “new” or “neo” institutional theory.  As just one more example, in their 
influential edited volume, Greenwood et al (2008: 4-5) define institutions as “more-or-less taken 
for granted repetitive social behavior that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive 
understandings that give meaning to social exchange and thus enable self-reproducing social 
order.”  This definition is made up of nine, tightly packed aspects.  Institutions are defined as (1) 
taken for granted, (2) repetitive, (3) comprise social behavior, (4) based on normative systems, 
(5) and cognitive understanding, (6) give meaning (7) and focus on social exchange, (8) self-
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reproduction, and (9) creating social order.  This is a lot, and the definition includes strong 
assumptions about how the social world hangs together.  We are open to the possibility that this 
definition does capture what institutions “are,” and what they “do,” but questions remain as to 
just how and how much these nine aspects actually do hang together and under what 
circumstances, or alternatively, when or how processes such as “social exchange” and “self-
reproduction” exist in their own right and exhibit some independence or autonomy from 
“institutions.”  Putting such questions aside, however, our key point is that this definition is very 
different from the original notions about “institutional myths” and organizational isomorphism 
that launched the new institutional endeavor.   
These are but a (admittedly convenient) sampling of the multiple definitions that exist.  
By highlighting them here we do not intend to criticize the individual authors.  Rather, we 
appreciate their efforts to, at least at a minimum, attempt to articulate what institutions “are,” 
even if the result is a collection of pseudo-definitions. Our central concern is that, for a theory 
that was developed to explain organizational homogeneity, there is abundant heterogeneity in the 
definitions of “institutions.”  
Granted this heterogeneity, is IT a coherent “theory,” or more of a set of varied 
approaches using the same intellectual brand?  We believe that, unless a scholar is prepared to 
specify which institutional theory s/he is working under, while carefully specifying its key 
elements, IT should be considered more of a “brand.”  As a brand it helps to provide broad 
identification into a scholarly tradition and it offers some value as a grouping to those who 
adhere to it, but this is quite different from—and may obstruct—theoretical clarity and 
interpretive capacity.   
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As a body of work, institutionalism seems to have traded theoretical coherence for brand 
diversity.  Further evidence of this exchange can be found in the many contemporary scholars 
who are exploring concerns such as “institutional entrepreneurship” (Garud, Hardy & Maguire, 
2007) or “institutional work” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).  These scholars are dealing with 
important questions (about change and agency) and using methods (typically qualitative) that are 
rather different than the concerns of classic new institutionalism (emphasizing stability, the level 
of the field, structural effects, and quantitative measures of surface conformity).  The concerns of 
“institutional entrepreneurship” and “institutional work” are much closer to those of Selznick and 
his interest in leadership (1957).  Indeed, Kraatz (2009, 2011) argues that IE and IW scholars—
with their concern with purposive activity—are reinventing the Selznickian wheel, but without 
his important focus on the role of the organization and the unintended consequences of purposive 
action. Nevertheless, contemporary IE and IW scholars wave that banner of neo institutionalism 
or “IT,” and not “old institutionalism.” 
As a brand, institutionalism is wildly successful. The proportion of published articles in 
organization studies including “institution” in the title, the abstract, or the keywords has doubled 
over less than 20 years (Alvesson & Blom 2018). The diversity evident in the approach suggests 
that it is not a singular theory, but rather a confederation of loosely coupled theories.  Old 
institutionalism is a coherent theory of organic organizational change.  Classic new 
institutionalism is largely coherent theory of field-level isomorphism (despite the differences 
between Meyer and Rowan and DiMaggio and Powell mentioned above).  Contemporary 
research on institutional work and institutional entrepreneurship have much in common with 
each other, and scholars working in these areas wave the “new institutional” or “neo I” banner, 
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but this is strange in that these works seem to have more in common with the “old” 
institutionalism that flourished from the 1950s to the 1970s than they do with the “new” 
institutionalism that formed between the late 1970s and the new millennium. 
The reader may find the word “brand” to be pejorative, but we need to acknowledge that, 
in today’s crowded field of mass research and mass publication, branding has become 
unavoidable.  Branding provides necessary labels and affiliations and it aids in positioning and 
clear signaling (the importance of which should be well-known to institutional theorists).  The 
“brand” problem in social science is hard to avoid and umbrella concepts with brand qualities are 
embraced (CMS, discourse, leadership, strategy as practice, etc.).  That institutionalists are in 
brand company does not mean that the problem is not significant.  Given IT’s popularity and 
enormous variation, the issue of branding stands at odds with theoretical clarity and 
distinctiveness.  As a minimal response to this problem we hope that we can at least work on 
trying to increase clarity about which “institutional theory” we are talking about and subscribing 
too.  For clarity, for the benefit of young scholars, and for the benefit of outsiders looking in, it 
would be helpful if institutional theorists would avoid the glossy terms “IT” and even “Neo I” 
and speak specifically of “old institutionalism,” “classic NI,” and perhaps “millennial” or “post” 
institutionalism.” 
An over-packaged use of “institution”?   
Q:  Does the over-packaged use of the term “institution” lead to slippery, and at times confused, 
contradictory, tautological reasoning?  Does this over-packaging inhibit our thinking rather than 
expanding it? 
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 Since institutional theory and research has become so vast, it is easy to select specific 
studies and successfully argue, in response to the first question above, “No, because here’s a case 
where the meaning of institution is concise, and it isn’t slippery or confusing.” We do not doubt 
that there are studies that avoid this problem.  We also recognize that vague definitions can be 
useful and have a place in scholarship, especially in exploratory and/or creative studies that 
develop new ideas and concepts.  Because institutional theory is now so broad, almost any 
critique can be dismissed through references to some examples that fall outside of the critique or 
provide a counter-point.  The field encompasses so much research that it has become a moving 
target, difficult to criticize.  
 However, for the sake of argument and debate, let us propose that the answer to the first 
question above is “yes.”  In some instances, we think this is certainly the case.  The problem is 
not simply that there are so many definitions of institutions, but also that, in some of the 
definitions, so much is packed into the term.  For example, Thornton et al. (2012) define 
“institutional logics” as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and 
material practices, including assumptions, values and beliefs, by which individuals and 
organizations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce 
their lives and experiences” (p 2).  There is so much that is included in this definition—social 
construction and history, the symbolic and the material, individuals and organizations, meaning 
and action, time and space—that it is hard to conceive of what might be excluded, and how an 
“institutional logic” differs meaningfully from an “institution.”  Moreover, these institutional 
logics seem to do quite a lot—and at the same time.  There is not much space left for 
“institutional non-logics” or for “non-institutional” forces to accomplish anything.  Nevertheless, 
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in the next paragraph, Thornton et al. add to the terminology with the notion of “institutional 
orders,” including family, religion, the state, professions, and so on.  These “institutional orders” 
seem to do the same things as “institutional logics,” but the “orders” also “shape how reasoning 
takes place and how rationality is perceived and experienced” (p. 2).  However, as a part of 
ordinary, common parlance (instead of theoretical parlance) “logics” are thought to shape 
reasoning and entail various rationales, so with the addition of “institutional orders” it becomes 
unclear if this is also what logics do, or if logics do something else.  All of these “institutional 
orders” influence individual and organizational behavior, but so do “institutional logics,” as 
indicated by the above definition.  An inquiring reader is left wondering what, exactly, 
institutional logics, institutional orders, and institutions distinctly “do.”      
 This kind of over-packaging creates slippage and a number of problems.  One problem, 
as noted in the previous paragraph, is that “institutions,” “logics,” and “order” seem to do the 
same things.  With this, an “institutional order” becomes an “order order.” This kind of 
tautological grammar is not merely redundant, it also creates confusion as to what is the 
explanandum, and what is the explanans.  A second and related problem with this kind of over-
packaged definition involves tautological reasoning.  For instance, the definition of “institutional 
logics” includes effects on individuals and organizations.  As such, it becomes odd to say that 
institutions influence individuals and organizations since they are already part of the definition.  
Since so much is included inside of the definition of an institutional logic, there is little that is 
left beyond the logic for the logic to explain.  That is, the logic cannot explain what it already is, 
because so much is endogenous to the definition.  The result of this kind of tautology is an 
expansive “relabeling” but not “explaining” (Liska 1969: 444).  By subsuming so much the 
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concept explains less, not more.  Although this may be an extreme interpretation and supporters 
of the institutional logics approach would surely argue otherwise (and we hope they do so), our 
point is that the over-packaging of the definition creates more confusion, not clarity.   
 A third problem with this kind of over-packaging is that it strips otherwise discrete 
concepts of their power.  To repeat part of the definition, institutional logics “provide meaning to 
individuals and organizations in their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce their 
lives and experiences.”  In this conceptualization time and space become subordinate to the 
logics that subsume them.  However, beyond institutional theory, there are entire studies on the 
sociology of time and space (Mead 1932, Hall 1966).  In these works “time” exists in its own 
right, as does “space,” and they likewise “provide meaning to individuals and organizations,” 
and create the conditions of possibility of action.  Yet in the institutional logics perspective time 
and space become, at best, mediating variables.  In contrast, if we were to keep time and space 
outside of the definition of an institutional logic, time and space would then provide alternative 
theoretical explanations for organizational and individual activity, and allow for different ways of 
thinking.  In contrast, the over-packaged definition of “institutional logics” elides this kind of 
theoretical pluralism in favor of a Meta theory.  This Meta theory incorporates nearly everything, 
but only as residual categories.   
 Fourth, because so much is included in the definition, it is unclear as to how the elements 
relate to each other and help to explain each other.  Take, for example, the “historical patterns” 
included in the definition of institutional logics.  Few would deny that there are some effects of 
historical patterns on individuals and organizations, but there is doubt as to whether historical 
patterns are so tightly coupled with the other parts of institutional logics—assumptions, beliefs, 
 12
the organizing of time and space, reproduction of lives, and so on.  Indeed, classic NI would 
expect these things to be loosely coupled.  If given a superficial glance, many things may appear 
to be governed by an “institutional logic,” but on closer empirical examination the many things 
included inside of the definition are far more muddled, and organizational life can exhibit 
multiple and inconsistent meanings, meaninglessness, incoherence, and turmoil (e.g. Hallett 
2010; Jackall 1988).  The response to this criticism may be that there are “multiple,” “plural” 
and/or “competing” institutional logics at play, but notice again how such a response 
subordinates discrete organizational processes to the overarching concept of “logics,” while too 
easily dismissing alternative theoretical frameworks and understandings.  
 Similar problems are evident in the concept of “institutional work,” an important part of 
which involves “organizing and establishing procedure” (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006: 223).  
According to Lawrence and Suddaby, institutional workers are “culturally competent actors with 
strong practical skills and sensibility who creatively navigate within their organizational 
fields” (2006: 219).  They are characterized by “awareness, skill, and reflexivity” (note that this 
appears to be almost the opposite of the dopey view of people in classic NI, despite the shared 
“institutional theory” brand).  Lawrence and Suddaby identify nine versions of work that creates 
institutions, six versions of work that maintains them, and three forms of work that disrupts 
institutions.  This is a comprehensive list, but including so much undermines the core idea of 
“organizing and establishing procedure.”  How does work that disrupts institutions also 
“organize and establish?”  Perhaps acts of disruption should be seen as “institutional unwork” or 
“unworking” institutions, narrowing the concept of “institutional work” instead of expanding it, 
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or directing scholars to the alternative, established literature on deinstitutionalization (Cherlin 
2004).  
 The over-packaging of “institutional work” also creates tautology and confusion.  For 
example, Lawrence and Suddaby argue: “The construction of identities as a form of institutional 
work is central to the creation of institutions” (2006: 223).  This is an obfuscating redundancy 
that becomes more evident if institution/al is replaced with its definition:  “The construction of 
identities as a form of (organizing and establishing procedure) is central to the creation of 
(organized, established procedures).”  Continuing their argument about identity and institutional 
work, the authors use an example in which employees of a non-profit museum are encouraged to 
see themselves as working in a business.  However, the meaning of an “institution” here does not 
work so well, because revising an identity is not really the same thing as creating a new 
procedure.  It is hard to equate an identity with a procedure and identity is also quite different 
from creating business-like rule structures that confer property rights or affect technical 
standards.  Nevertheless, as long as the authors use the ambiguous signifier “institutional work” 
the text seems reasonable, as it allows vague associations.  However, if the specific meaning is 
inserted into the language then the definition becomes problematic and leads to slippery 
reasoning.    
 When adopting the language of “institutional logics” and “institutional work,” everything 
becomes an “institution”:  from the handshake to the corporation, from the judicial form to the 
Western conceptions of the individual, from the family firm to a procedure for accountability.  
By seeing institutions (logics) everywhere—spanning historical patterns of cultural symbols and 
material practices which reproduce life experience and organized procedures—concepts or 
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insights that could have fallen outside of the expansive lexicon are either co-opted or ignored.  
With this, it is possible that scholars who have bought into the expansive lexicon of institutions 
may find it difficult to conceive of their research in ways that are not inflected through 
institutional theory.  As Suddaby (2010: 14) has warned, “just as the world becomes a nail to a 
boy with a hammer, so too do we lose the variety and complexity of the empirical world when 
we begin to view it through a common theoretical lens.”  In this way, the over-packaging of 
institutional concepts inhibits thinking instead of expanding it.  We have to wonder if the world 
of organizational studies is becoming populated with people and hammers nailing down 
organizational phenomena, sometimes in ways that make them unrecognizable.  
Institutionalized theory:  The path to scholarly legitimacy?  
Q:  Has institutional theory become too much of a ready-made (if ambiguous) template to guide 
what constitutes “good” research?  Has it become too easy or tempting to follow established 
templates set out by the various stands of IT than to engage in the costly search for alternative 
theories to illuminate one’s data in a novel way?   
The answer to these questions may very-well be “no.”  As junior scholars will attest, 
there is very little about the research and publishing process that is “easy,” and as accountability 
metrics and quantitative measures of productivity expand in academia, the pressure to publish 
and the stakes involved have only been increasing.  Moreover, because institutional theories are 
now so broad and ambiguous, it can be quite difficult to learn and make sense of the expanse of 
IT and its various “templates.”  As theories go, IT is not an easy one to comprehend, and classic 
NI in particular is (or was at the time of its appearance and peak) non-intuitive, which is also 
why it is so interesting and compelling (Davis 1971).  That so much is published with 
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“institution” in the title may not indicate that it is easy, it may be seen as proof of the high quality 
of the work, the “truth” of the various institutional ideas, or may simply reflect the large number 
of people who find value in using and adding to institutional theory (whatever institutional 
theory may mean).   
Nevertheless, let us suppose that the answer to these questions is “yes.”  As the field has 
become established, we have indeed witnessed what Tolbert and Zucker (1996) called “the 
institutionalization of institutional theory.”  A worry here is that contemporary academics are 
highly focused on getting published in the right journals and they may then follow 
(institutionalized) routes and templates that seem to optimize chances for success and 
recognition.  Here we have the opportunity to turn institutionalism on itself, that is, to use 
institutional theory to analyse institutional research.  Doing so provides yet another example of 
the enduring value of institutional theory, but also the potential irrationality of institutional 
research in practice.   
In classic new institutional thinking, one of the central characteristics of an institution is 
that it provides actors with a template to guide them as to what legitimate social action is (Meyer 
et al., 1987: 22).  Following this, institutional theory may provide researchers with a framework 
that can be used to make their research appear as legitimate.  That is, when engaging with 
institutional theory, a research project is effectively “enacting” a number of established templates 
that guide and constitute “good research.”  With this, the scholar’s attention is directed to a 
growing menu of “institutional” phenomena—legitimacy, logics, mimesis, change, complexity, 
entrepreneurship, work, and more.  So armed, the scholar can go into almost any empirical 
setting with these existing categories and look to fill them in.  As a result, what might be 
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considered esoteric topics by mainstream management and organization scholars—such as the 
market for contemporary Indian art (Kahari and Wadhwani, 2010), the norms in US gay bath 
houses (Hudson, 2008), anarchist activists in London (Perkmann and Spicer, 2014), and the 
rituals of formal dining in colleges at the University of Cambridge (Dacin et al., 2010)—are 
rendered legitimate.  We are not arguing that these studies are not “good.”  Indeed we recognize 
their value.  Our point is that they are rather odd from the perspective of management and 
organization studies, and they would seem even more bizarre if not for their institutional 
clothing.  The ceremonial label of “institution” and “institutional theory” can be a means to craft 
legitimacy around seemingly peripheral and possibly “illegitimate” management and 
organizational topics (Elsbach and Sutton 1992).   
To be sure, there are many cases where the institutional label, the data, and the theory are 
a strong match, and are mutually reinforcing.  However, if classic new institutional theory is 
correct in its depiction of how the world works, there are surely instances—even published ones
—where the apparent fit between the data and the theory is “ceremonial.”  With a twist on Meyer 
and Rowan, we must wonder if there are times where institutional theory is adopted and used not 
because it provides a special understanding of a phenomena or a set of empirical material, but 
because it confers legitimacy onto the research project.  If so, this may actually promote a loose 
coupling between institutional theory and the empirical material that is presumably being used to 
understand.  The existing body of research in classic new institutionalism would suggest that this 
would especially be the case for latecomers, who might adopt institutional theory to make their 
work (and indeed themselves) appear as legitimate.  However, this kind of ceremonial practice 
would offer little in the way of significant, novel contributions to knowledge. 
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 As Zucker has argued, “social knowledge once institutionalized exists as a fact, as part of 
objective reality, and can be transmitted directly on that basis” (1977: 726).  This means that a 
body of theory that had previously been seen as rather radical (as classic new institutionalism 
was from the late 1970s to the late 1990s) becomes treated as an unproblematic part of how the 
world is.  It is possible that concepts such as institutions, fields, myths, isomorphism, 
institutional work, and institutional entrepreneurs are increasingly treated as objective realities to 
be found out there in the field.  When this happens, many of the assumptions, questions, and 
ambiguities associated with each of these concepts become taken-for-granted realities.  As 
Willmott (2011: 69) points out, “in institutional theory, ‘institution’ and especially ‘individual’ 
assume a reified, self-evident status, and, in this respect, proponents of institutional theory are 
forgetful of their (our) own institutional work.”  This kind of research practice would be good for 
institutional theory and the institutional theorists who are ritually cited, but bad for social 
science. 
Conclusion 
 In asking the questions presented in this essay, we hope to prompt useful debate about the 
state of institutional theory and research.  To be provocative, we have provided answers in a 
critical, if ultimately sympathetic, form.  We see some problems in the coherence, packaging, and 
practice of institutional theory and research.  Institutional theory seems to have an important 
paradox at its heart:  On the one hand, it offers a confusing array of mixed metaphors, ideas, and 
knowledge claims.  On the other hand, institutional theory is often presented as an “it”—that is, 
an integrated and robust theory.  We have articulated some ways in which these tensions could be 
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problematic, and we recognize that other readers will find them less so.  We encourage further 
reflection and a defence of institutional theory and practice or, alternatively, some basic 
rethinking and redevelopment, possibly along radical routes.  The overall field of institutional 
research includes some very important contributions, including Selznick (1949, 1957), Meyer & 
Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Hwang and Powell (2009), and others who do 
manage to achieve clarity.  However, in the overall field of research it is difficult to get a clear-
sighted overview or sense of direction.  Even when some scholars and publications successfully 
avoid tautologies, confusions, and other problems, their readers may be less fortunate in sorting 
through the broad and vague definitions and the multitude of texts that use the key signifier of 
‘institution’ in different ways. On the level of the field, messy assemblies of texts with broad, 
vague and inconsistent definitions make it difficult to comprehend the whole.  
 We realize that many of the types of concerns we have raised here pertain not only to 
institutional theory, but also to other theories and areas of research.  That these provocative 
questions are not unique to a specific field does not diminish their importance when considering 
the on-going development and practice of institutional theory and research.  With a liberal mind-
set, some may conclude that the answers to the questions posed here indicate that the range of 
definitions in IT is not problematic, that it is a coherent theory – or a set of clearly demarcated 
and distinct theories, with enough similarities to motivate the use of a common signifier –and not 
a brand, that the term “institution” has not been over-packaged, and that it has not become too 
easy to conduct research based on existing IT templates.  Even if this is the case, our more 
critical responses have identified what the problems could look like were they to come to 
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fruition, and alert us as to what to watch for and be vigilant of, to prevent institutional theory 
from tumbling from its lofty peaks.    
 Should these problems exist, or should they come to exist, what is to be done?  One 
possibility would be to call for a moratorium on the use of the term “institution.”  This might 
compel scholars to clarify what they mean.  If we mean cultural mythologies, what is lost if we 
call them that?  Or, if we mean structural convergence and surface organizational conformity in 
response to environmental pressures, what is lost if we call it “isomorphism theory?”  If we mean 
activities that create new styles of social organization, what is lost by saying that, specifically, 
instead of calling it “institutional entrepreneurship?”  What would be lost if we spoke not of 
“institutional work,” but rather specific types of work that create and organize procedures?  We 
believe that doing so would create clarity, and would also help scholars to identify related 
literatures and areas of research instead of remaining comfortably within an expanding 
institutional bubble.  Importantly, this does not entail a rejection of the various institutional 
theories. Scholars can and should continue to use the valuable ideas inherent in institutional 
theories.  We advocate for the use and articulation of institutional theories without use of the 
obfuscating term “institution.”  Good substantive content would not suffer from the discontinued 
use of a potentially problematic brand-label. Sound research should qualify without support of an 
institutional branding. This certainly worked for Selznick and his colleagues, as well as Meyer 
and his colleagues, long before “old” and “new” institutionalism were termed by DiMaggio and 
Powell in 1991.   
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